# **Profile of the 2007 Australian Election**

**Prepared by** 

**Australian Development Strategies Pty Ltd** 

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# **Summary of Findings**

Kevin Rudd in 2007 achieved the impossible and breathed life into the Whitlam era blue collar Labor voter, hitherto presumed dead and reincarnated as Howard Battlers. Right across all Australian working class suburbs and electorates, the Whitlam profile stirred into life via the sons and daughters of Gough.

The 2007 profile was no where near as strong as it had been in days of Whitlam, as the union base underlying Whitlam's vote has long since disappeared, but it was there. The lack of unionised skilled blue collar workers was made up for by male white collar workers at levels exceeding those achieved by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. On the flip side, the professionals and the better paid began the move back towards the levels of Liberal support existing prior to John Howard's win in 1996. In other words, the Howard Battlers voted for Rudd and the professional women began to drift back to their Tory heartland.

And while we're on the subject of renewal, the strongest correlate of the swing to Kevin Rudd's new Labor Party was Pentecostal church goers, alongside Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Lutherans, Salvos, Seventh Day Adventists and the Uniting Church. With the Uniting Church included, these activist religions represent ten percent of Australians here in total, and they were located in the best possible areas for Labor. In fact, 12 out of the top 20 Pentecostal seats in Australia are located in Kevin Rudd's home state of Queensland and Kevin won five of them. While the blue collar workers provided the grunt with the national swing, the religious activists provided the leverage and the key seats. There was no sign of a net loss of support from the Family First party this election, but from the last FF profile we did in 2004, Rudd got the lot in 2007 – single parents, religious activists and third quartile skilled blue collar workers. Where their current base of support comes from, remains a mystery to us and we suspect, to Family First.

In fact the profile of the Rudd majority looks a little like a seventies Gough Whitlam rally held in a Queensland rural Church hall – Blacktown meets Nambour - with high school educated skilled and unskilled blue collar workers sitting side by side with the evangelical and activist religions – and making up the numbers are kids, lots of them, from babies up to ten year olds. But for those persons without kids, the swings in the swinging voter age groups 25-39 must have been against Labor as the combined total of this age group swung to the Coalition. In other words, if you were thirty something with a ten year old child, you swung to the ALP, if you were a thirty something without a child, you swung to Howard. The "working families" rhetoric worked both ways.

While their parents' religious profile would normally have them attending the new wave of Christian schools, the Kevin Rudd voters were overwhelmingly drawn from parents sending their children to Government schools. With young families and Certificate qualifications and long



commutes from outer suburbs to city jobs, the Rudd majority tended to be in the earlier keenly felt years of mortgage repayments funded from median level incomes, however the more powerful form of regression analysis indicates that it was the pre-school kids rather than the mortgage which provided the explaining power for the range of swings to the ALP.

Even pre-school kids faded in the final steps of the regression, shouldered aside by a negative coefficient for renters, usually without kids. **So downward envy of family tax benefits played some role in this result.** If the ALP doesn't take this into account when planning family tax benefits in their future budgets, they could be in all manner of strife, especially from inner city professional Greens with highs rents to pay and no kids to minimise tax.

The major components of the Labor campaign can be read off from the profile – persons driving to work voted against higher petrol prices, parents of young pre-schoolers voted for better child care and parents of kids in Government schools voted for a computer. They bought the whole Labor package. The wealthier professional groups in the inner suburbs voted for the best tax top end package, offered by the Coalition.

The underlying influence of the ACTU campaign is more mixed. We saw big swings to Labor from blue collar men and women in manufacturing, construction and transport, and in retail for women. The last two industries received below average wage increases from 1994 to 2006, so you'd expect them to be hostile to work choices, and transport was strongly unionized as well – with 29 percent union members and well positioned to run a pro Labor campaign.

But the big manufacturing and construction industries had average pay increases and average levels of unionism, so there's no obvious disproportionate reason why workers in this industry would swing to Labor, other than an expectation of manufacturing protection and less oversight of the construction industry – and an effective campaign by their respective unions.

The surprise here really is the public sector where the ACTU has retained strong levels of unionism. In public administration, where wages under Howard had kept pace with national averages, there was a swing against Labor and this is an industry where one in three workers is a union member, compared to the national figure of one in five.

The real surprise packet here for us was teachers. The education sector has 40 percent union membership and a lousy record of wage increases over 1994 to 2006, compared to national rises, according to our quick examination of the ABS data for the education industry as a whole. But they didn't blame Howard and instead voted one Green, two Liberal in big numbers.

We have also profiled the early AWAs around in 2004 and the more AWAs in a seat, the bigger the swing to the Coalition in 2004. There was no reliable data from the Government on subsequent AWAs so we weren't able to repeat the exercise for 2007. We did see however the same



groups from the AWAs in 2004, leading the gross swings to the Coalition in 2007. This is why the Howard Government did so well, again, in Western Australia, which contains a hugely disproportionate percentage of AWAs, at least for the time being.

These groups could be male miners from a remote mining site. Or they could be internationally qualified city based female professionals, with an Irish accent or speaking Mandarin, working in property or business services and seeking an income commensurate with their ability to work anywhere they choose in a global economy.

The pro Labor swing went up to 14.4 percent to Labor in Forde, one of the many Queensland seats with high concentrations of former Howard Battlers and Churchgoers. Where you had both demographic groups overlapping in the one seat, the Liberals were blasted out.

But in other regions, such as Western Australia, or the richer city seats, or the country areas, there were swings of up 3.1 percent against Labor.

With this range of 17.5 percent, it's pretty obvious that in individual booths, large groups moved back to Howard and this swing was led by female professionals. It included male professionals, graduates in science and arts, persons living alone, consultants, the AWA group – from a diverse background including those born in Ireland, USA, Canada, Singapore or Malaysia. In short, the rich, the well educated and the internationally qualified.

In fact, if you rank the swings to the Coalition, you'll see the top 20 with strong concentrations of professional women, or in Western Australia, where the workforce was dominated by AWAs.

If 2007 was the election where Kevin Rudd reinvented the Whitlamite Labor voter, it was also the election where the Coalition rediscovered their old fashioned seventies style base in the fast growing group of and inner urban wealthy professionals.

We have to remember here that in 2004, the average plumber was more likely to vote Liberal than the average doctor. In 2007, their allegiances swapped.

The reality in modern Australia is that a young plumber is paid more than a young doctor, has no HECS debt like the doctor and can get paid through a small incorporated entity or better still by a mining company and doesn't have to contend with the Australian health bureaucracy or professional indemnity insurance. In other words, the old fashioned SES scores of income and social status are a crock.

Which leads us onto the Pendulum and to the Greens. We profiled the Greens' primary votes and the found a familiar group defined by their studies – arts, society and culture, architecture and education. For jobs, they tend to be professional consultants, or work in the media, health or

education. They are very well paid, inner urban renters, who make extensive use of public transport and have few religious convictions. Some of them still wear sandals and long socks and hang around uni refectories but increasingly now, this is a well heeled professional group and many of them are aged 70 plus with worm farms and backyard chook pens, tending to their raised vegetable beds every week according to the Peter Cundall weekly guide. But doesn't everybody?

The Greens in 2007 were also very strongly linked to all major groups swinging to the Coalition. In other words, many top income professionals who had been swinging to Labor between 1998 and 2004 voted one Green and two Liberal in 2007. We are looking here at about 1.5 percent of the total electorate. The bulk of the Greens, about 80 percent of the 7.8 percent primary vote, tend to preference the ALP, but the primary vote for the Greens is now getting so high from Left wing voters and disaffected Liberals in some inner urban, hitherto safe Labor seats, that the Greens are looking to be a serious chance of winning some of them in the near future, if they can poll more primary votes than the Liberals and pull Labor down to the mid 40 percent range.

This is not news to Finance Minister Lindsay Tanner. Despite being one of Labor's best performers with a very high personal vote, he fell below 50 percent of the primary vote last election, the Liberal candidate was eliminated before the Greens and Tanner scraped home with 54.7 percent of the preferred vote. In other words, a five percent swing to the Greens from Labor would have cost Tanner his seat.

And yet, Melbourne is listed on the pendulum as a 72 percent safe Labor seat! This is total nonsense and shows the pendulum as a predictive device has limitations. It's a marginal seat which could easily be lost by Labor if Tanner retired, or if Labor couldn't deliver to the Greens over the next three years.

Similarly, six percent swings from Labor to the Greens could cost Labor the seats of Sydney (Tanya Plibersek) and Grayndler (Anthony Albanese) and Batman (Martin Ferguson) aren't far behind. If Labor did lose some of these seats to the Greens, the Coalition could need to win fewer seats for a majority or force Labor into a Coalition with the Greens ... not a course of action recommended by the Tasmanian ALP.

The pendulum also takes no note of the loss or gain of personal votes, as we noted before the election when we predicted Cowan would need a four percent swing to be retained by Labor, due to the retirement of popular ALP sitting member Graham Edwards. The seat was easily lost by Labor with 48.3 percent, when a uniform swing would have given Labor more than 56 percent of the vote. Some consolation presumably, to the ALP candidate who lost.

Speaking of winners and losers, the profiling shows the difference between the computer predicted vote from our model and the actual vote, called a residual. It's actually due to a few factors external to the model and it's a fair approximation of the personal vote of the respective



candidates or local factors (no National Party candidate to win the rural poor pulls down the Coalition vote in some seats) and it can make the difference between winning or losing a close seat or a close election.

The best candidate and campaign for Labor was run by the former Colonel Mike Kelly who won Eden Monaro with 53.4 percent of the vote, despite our model predicting Labor would get only 46.7 percent. Labor also won Flynn, despite a predicted loss.

So there were two wins against the predictions for Labor, but the enormous advantage of incumbency and associated personal votes for the Coalition meant that Coalition candidates won eight seats which the modelling predicted should have gone to Labor, a net gain of six seats.

These seats were Hughes, Sturt, Greenway, Aston, McEwen, Dunkley, Dickson and Swan (the last of which should have been retained by Labor).

One of the unluckiest star performers in the personal vote stakes on election night was John Winston Howard, who lost narrowly to Maxine McKew, despite polling seven percent better than predicted in his long standing seat of Bennelong. His personal vote improved by 5.3 percent between 2004 and 2007 but it wasn't enough to counter the rising tide of support for Labor. In other words, the Battle of Bennelong was won convincingly by John Howard the candidate, but John Howard the PM had already lost the war.

The predicted vote for Labor of 58.4 percent means that, without Howard, McKew should develop Bennelong into a comfortable Labor seat.

And finally, Labor's Nicole Cornes did well against sitting Liberal Member Andrew Southcott, despite the sledging from the usual suspects. Her seat's swing was held back by the large number of richer professionals in Boothby who swung back to Howard.



# **Methodology**

The analysis takes as its starting point the Elaborate database assembled by the principals of ADS over 34 years of demographic profiling of economic, social and political behaviour.

The ADS Database uses Census and modelled data, from a range of sources, including the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Australian Taxation Office and Centrelink.

The Education Database contains some 500 variables and includes a core of basic variables including Age, Income, Occupation, Industry, Home Ownership, Household Type, Mortgage and Rent, Travel to Work, Vehicles, Employment Status, Religion, Internet Use, Current Education, Education Level Attained, Field of Study, Qualifications, Language Spoken at Home and Family Type.

The primary units in the Database are Census Collectors Districts, or CCDs, comprising about 220 household neighbourhoods, which are small enough to provide a fine grained demographic picture of Australia, through 38,000 CCDs. Other units include polling booth catchments, postcodes, and state and federal electoral boundaries. We always try to use the smallest units we can find, but in federal elections, this creates problems with the allocation of non-booth votes to spatial boundaries.

We use SPSS Statistical analysis to compare this Elaborate database, with appropriate dependent variables, in this case, ALP 2PP 2007 vote, 2004-2007 2PP swing and the Green Primary House of Representatives vote. These correlations provide the basis of the stereotype tables and the correlation charts in the results section below.

Relevant correlations are then processed in an SPSS package in a Step-Wise Multiple Linear Regression, to generate regression equations which uses the demographic picture of vote and swing, to predict what level of vote and swing there would be in each Federal seat, given what we now know about the demographic background of voters. The difference between the predicted and observed votes, the residual, is then calculated.

# **Results and Discussion**



#### Union membership & ALP blue collar vote



Chart 1. Skilled blue collar workers (biggest male workforce group) have been leaving unions and re-aligning towards the Coalition since the late seventies, although the group retained weak support for Labor. They swung to the ALP in 2007.



#### Changing profile of the Labor voter

Chart 2. Labor gains skilled blue collar men and clerical men and women in 2007, but support slumps from professionals. Professional and clerical women are two dominant groups in the female workforce. Occupational definitions change slightly over time, explaining some of the fluctuations.

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### **Stereotypes**

Tables below show selected top positive and negative correlations between database variables and political variables in the analysis, with the means for each variable for Australia.

Each table is a brief snapshot of the party's typical voter. The Australian means enable the reader to gauge the significance of each variable in the stereotype. What we are looking for here is strong correlations with bigger groups.

Correlations are a descriptive tool only, and not necessarily analytical. But they tell you a lot about your target voters in your key seats and if you attract the votes of enough of them, you win the big spatial correlation ... a majority of seats in the House of Representatives.

A member of the Greek Orthodox Church for example, is positively correlated with the Labor vote and if you want to find Labor voters, look inside a Greek Orthodox Church any Sunday. But it's a **descriptive** variable only. When you factor in jobs and income, the religious factor here doesn't **explain** why they vote Labor. The cultural factor becomes submerged by the economic factors and you need to look at other factors that go to make up that cultural group.

However, with the Pentecostals and Lutherans, their explaining power stuck right through the regression analysis. So it was a descriptive **and** an analytical variable. They believed in Kevin Rudd and voted for him. This is not a common thing to see in this sort of analysis where faith normally comes a distant second to economic necessity.

The analysis also found young children correlated with the swing to Labor. Children don't vote, so it is obviously their parents who swung to Labor. But there's no sign of the parents in the swing charts, which is very unusual. The only reason we can see is that persons of the same age as the parents swung the other way, to the Coalition and that this swing outweighed the Labor swing. When we look at women of a child bearing age, we see that a majority in the 20-34 year groups don't have children.

In the regression analysis, pre-schoolers eventually got shoved out of the equation as a positive, by private sector renters, who were a negative predictor of the ALP swing. These renters don't seem to have liked the idea of more tax benefits to parents of young kids. This is an area of potential research for any party interested in winning the next election.



Code	2PP ALP vote 2007	2PP Swing to ALP 04-07	Primary Greens 07 Reps	Australian Means (RHS)
Single Parent kids over 15	0.63	-0.03	0.23	7.03
fNo school	0.56	-0.01	-0.02	0.91
Clerical & administrative	0.52	-0.11	0.34	6.13
Christ_Eastern_Orthodox_F_mean	0.52	-0.03	0.14	2.57
Christ_Eastern_Orthodox_M_mean	0.52	-0.02	0.13	2.64
Unemployed	0.51	0.13	-0.04	3.53
Rented State	0.51	0.01	0.13	3.97
Spanish	0.50	0.06	0.03	0.41
No school	0.50	-0.01	-0.07	0.77
Mort \$1400-1599	0.50	0.26	-0.06	7.24
Transport	0.49	0.45	-0.39	6.88
Islam_M_mean	0.49	0.05	-0.06	1.64
fSpanish	0.49	0.06	0.02	0.44
Islam_F_mean	0.48	0.06	-0.07	1.46
fosfEngineering	0.48	0.08	-0.06	2.27
No Cars	0.47	-0.20	0.47	9.53
Elsewhere	0.47	-0.08	0.15	3.22
Croatian	0.47	0.02	-0.03	0.28
fCroatian	0.47	0.00	-0.01	0.28
Internet Not Stated	0.46	0.01	-0.06	3.29
fVietnamese	0.46	-0.03	-0.02	0.85
fVietnam	0.46	-0.05	0.00	0.74
Buddhism_F_mean	0.46	-0.10	0.12	2.09

The no cars group tend to be the transitional poor – students – or lower income inner city groups, now getting displaced by rich young professionals from the inner urban precincts.

Code	2PP ALP vote 2007	2PP Swing to ALP 04-07	Primary Greens 07 Reps	Australian Means (RHS)
Managers	-0.71	-0.18	-0.07	16.70
Worked at home	-0.66	-0.05	-0.22	5.53
fosfEducation	-0.65	0.02	-0.18	11.63
fosfHealth	-0.60	-0.01	-0.12	13.99
55-59	-0.60	-0.01	-0.20	6.52
fManagers	-0.58	-0.18	-0.04	10.53
f55-59	-0.57	0.02	-0.22	6.40
f60-64	-0.57	0.02	-0.24	10.20
English	-0.56	0.06	-0.14	79.62
fEnglish	-0.56	0.06	-0.14	79.89
fosAgriculture & Environment	-0.53	-0.03	-0.29	3.64
Other Tenure	-0.50	-0.03	-0.22	0.90
Mort Not Stated	-0.50	-0.10	-0.31	9.41
f50-54	-0.49	0.00	-0.19	6.79
Agriculture forestry & fishing	-0.49	-0.02	-0.32	5.57
60-64	-0.49	-0.01	-0.13	5.07
50-54	-0.49	0.05	-0.20	6.77
fAgriculture\ forestry & fishing	-0.47	0.00	-0.34	3.38
Four or More	-0.47	0.15	-0.47	5.29
Christ_Anglican_F_mean	-0.46	-0.01	-0.13	19.39
Christ_Anglican_M_mean	-0.45	0.01	-0.14	17.99
fosfAgriculture & Environment	-0.45	0.01	-0.27	1.41
Christ_Uniting_Church_M_mean	-0.45	0.22	-0.34	5.27

**Table 2** shows the stereotype for the 2007Coalition voter.

With a 2PP model, negative correlations for the ALP are positive correlations for the Coalition and should be read from the top down.

Coalition supporters in 2007 show up as the traditional managers and home based income splitters.

The profile also includes Health and Education professionals – not a good sign for the ALP's policy development in these areas. You would think a strong policy in health and education would gain the support of the professionals engaged in the industry and not just the clients.

The other traditional large mainstream Tory groups can be seen here – the 50 plus, farmers, Australian born and Anglicans and other mainstream protestant groups.

We've been looking at the same chart now for 34 years.

Code	2PP ALP vote 2007	2PP Swing to ALP 04-07	Primary Greens 07 Reps	Australian Means (RHS)
Christ_Pentecostal_F_mean	-0.11	0.47	-0.45	1.11
Christ_Pentecostal_M_mean	-0.08	0.45	-0.42	0.97
Transport	0.49	0.45	-0.39	6.88
\$600-799	-0.01	0.44	-0.55	11.69
F\$400-599	-0.26	0.44	-0.57	15.00
fosEngineering	-0.02	0.41	-0.59	29.35
Machinery operators & drivers	0.32	0.40	-0.55	11.10
Fam \$1200-1399	-0.06	0.40	-0.47	6.95
fCertificate total	-0.12	0.39	-0.56	23.51
Certificate total	-0.17	0.39	-0.58	42.91
Manufacturing	0.34	0.38	-0.40	14.11
fosfFood, Hospitality & Personal	-0.07	0.37	-0.51	6.67
Fam \$1000-1199	-0.20	0.36	-0.51	11.60
Total Govt	-0.21	0.36	-0.58	9.52
5-9	-0.12	0.36	-0.61	6.56
f5-9	-0.17	0.36	-0.65	6.16
Ave hhold size	0.12	0.35	-0.49	2.52
\$800-999	0.09	0.35	-0.35	9.22
fTransport	0.39	0.35	-0.30	2.48
f10-14	-0.24	0.35	-0.62	6.41
Other	0.28	0.35	-0.37	3.80
Primary Govt	-0.25	0.34	-0.57	5.80
10-14	-0.22	0.34	-0.60	6.85

**Table 3** shows the stereotype of the 2004 to 2007 2PP swing towards the ALP.

Here we see the swing dominated by evangelical and activist religions, alongside blue collar skilled and unskilled workers.

There are median to third quartile income males, females and families, many of which would have voted Family First at the 2004 election.

There are also certificate qualified males and females, which matches up with the job and income profile.

Also there are parents of Government school children and young children under 10.

In summary, we are looking at families with young kids ("working families"), buying a home, driving a car to work from the outer suburbs, just above median income and with a mainstream education.

These parents clearly want a better public school system than they've been getting from their State Governments.

But where are the non parents of the same age? Living in rented units and homes and swinging to Howard, we think, from later evidence.

	2PP ALP vote	2PP Swing to ALP	Primary Greens 07	Australian Means (RHS)
(Drofossionala	2007	04-07	Reps	21 55
	0.02	-0.40	0.07	21.00
Don	-0.15	-0.30	0.01	16.60
Single Person Home	0.04	-0.38	0.05	24.63
for Natural & Physical Sciences	0.03	-0.38	0.51	24.03
fosSociety & Culture	0.00	-0.30	0.50	5.53
Professional consulting	0.12	-0.37	0.00	6 37
flisa	-0.17	-0.36	0.50	0.37
Bachelor Degree	0.17	-0.36	0.57	17.08
Ireland	0.00	-0.35	0.43	0.27
fSingapore	-0.08	-0.35	0.36	0.21
F\$2000+	-0.15	-0.35	0.50	1.51
fosfCreative Arts	0.17	-0.35	0.76	3.49
F\$1600-1999	-0.03	-0.34	0.55	1.23
Singapore	-0.08	-0.34	0.35	0.17
Fam \$3000+	-0.10	-0.34	0.51	6.14
Canada	-0.15	-0.34	0.52	0.16
fBachelor Degree	0.03	-0.34	0.53	23.94
fIreland	-0.04	-0.33	0.36	0.26
\$2000+	-0.23	-0.33	0.44	5.44
Postgraduate	0.07	-0.33	0.56	4.65
fProfessional consulting	0.05	-0.32	0.55	6.09
Graduate Diploma	0.07	-0.32	0.60	1.77
fPostgraduate	0.16	-0.32	0.62	3.84
F\$1300-1599	-0.02	-0.32	0.54	2.63
F\$1000-1299	0.00	-0.32	0.53	5.57

**Table 4** shows the stereotype of the swing towards theCoalition. It should be read from the top down.

The swings to the Coalition were led by the very large female occupation group of professionals. In fact, there are a lot "f's" in front of the variables and clearly a lot of women were not attracted to the ALP campaign.

Other groups swinging to Howard included those living alone (not "working families"), graduates in science and arts, professional consultants, the well paid males, females and females (top Octile) and the very well qualified, with diplomas, degrees and post grad qualifications.

We also see the internationally qualified AWA profile from our earlier profile. This is the group in high workforce demand which clearly enjoyed better conditions under AWAs and in WA and which voted for the Coalition in 2004 as well as 2007.

They include those younger, single persons with tertiary skills born in the UK and Ireland, the USA and Canada or Singapore, Malaysia and SE Asia.

The Coalition cleaned up at the top end of the income range, the group which retained a benefit from the top end differences in the two tax packages and from family units without kids. The "working families" line from Labor obviously grated with these groups who seem to be alienated from more tax discrimination in favour of parents with young children.

	2PP ALP vote	2PP Swing to ALP	Primary Greens 07	Australian Means (RHS)	Tal vote
Code	2007	04-07	Reps		The
fosfCreative Arts	0.17	-0.35	0.76	3.49	oft
fosCreative Arts	0.29	-0.30	0.76	2.16	ort
Other_Religious_Affil_M_mean	0.15	-0.21	0.67	0.90	cor
fProfessionals	0.02	-0.40	0.67	21.55	den
fosSociety & Culture	0.12	-0.37	0.65	5.53	also
Professionals	0.04	-0.38	0.65	16.60	sou
Arts & recreaction	0.14	-0.29	0.65	1.37	
fosfArchitecture & Building	0.07	-0.31	0.64	0.67	We
Education	0.06	-0.29	0.64	4.23	the
fosfSociety & Culture	0.21	-0.25	0.63	11.80	vot
fPostgraduate	0.16	-0.32	0.62	3.84	per
USA	-0.15	-0.38	0.61	0.32	hes
Graduate Diploma	0.07	-0.32	0.60	1.77	that
Professional consulting	0.01	-0.37	0.59	6.37	that
fMedia	0.23	-0.28	0.59	1.65	ort
fUSA	-0.17	-0.36	0.59	0.32	ont
University	0.24	-0.29	0.59	3.60	R1g
Other_Religious_Affil_F_mean	0.13	-0.13	0.59	0.48	aro
fCanada	-0.19	-0.30	0.58	0.17	
Bachelor Degree	0.08	-0.36	0.57	17.08	As
fosNatural & Physical Sciences	0.06	-0.38	0.56	2.56	by t
Postgraduate	0.07	-0.33	0.56	4.65	edu
Media	0.22	-0.25	0.56	1.95	the
fProfessional consulting	0.05	-0.32	0.55	6.09	the
F\$1600-1999	-0.03	-0.34	0.55	1.23	
F\$1300-1599	-0.02	-0.32	0.54	2.63	The
fArts & recreaction	0.19	-0.22	0.54	1.43	1110
fGraduate Diploma	-0.05	-0.31	0.53	3.39	con

**Table 5** shows the Green profile for the 2007 Green Primary vote in the House of Representatives.

The most interesting thing in this table is the fact that most of the Green demographic strongholds are also positive correlations in the ALP vote column, and **not one of the demographic groups which voted strongly Green in 2007 also swung to the Labor Party in 2007. This should sound warning bells for the ALP in the inner city.** 

We are dealing here with the primary green Reps vote and the 2PP ALP vote, the latter of which includes Greens who voted One Green, Two Labor. There's a lot – about 80 percent of Greens who did this in 2004 and 2007 - but the best interpretation of the this data we can come up with is that the remaining 20 percent of Greens (about 1.5 percent of the electorate) must have moved from Labor to Green and on to the Liberals. So the Greens warehoused a swing to the Right for the professional classes, rather than the other way around, which is the usual pattern.

As to who the Greens were in 2007, they remained defined by their study – arts, society and culture, architecture and education and included professional consultants, workers in the media, health and education. They continued to live in the inner city and make extensive use of public transport.

They don't have any religious faith and so have little in common with the pro-Rudd ALP swing. The reverse in fact.

### **Correlation charts**

The correlation charts below show the strength of the relationship between votes and the Elaborate Database, for most of the 500 variables, presented in various categories, starting with Age.

The charts are in standard excel format, with correlations for the ALP 2PP shown in red bars or lines, with the 2PP 2004-2007 Swing shown in pink and the 2007 Green Reps primary vote shown in green. The Australian means for each corresponding variable are shown below, with the relevant figure on the right axis.

Correlation charts should be read the same way as the worm debating chart – the zero line is neutral and the score heightens as the correlation increases its distance above or below the zero line. Correlations above the line indicate a positive relationship and correlations below the line show a negative relationship. The significance levels vary according to the number of pairs and we would advise the reader not to get too excited about any correlations below plus or minus .15.

Similarly, the reader should be cautious about high correlations from variables with a very low mean, from the more esoteric religions, or unusual countries of birth or languages spoken at home. This is an arbitrary call, but, if it's less than about half of one percent of the population, it's usually pretty meaningless. In summary, we are looking in the charts for longer vertical bars or trend lines, above or below 0.20, consistent patterns across each chart and big population numbers.

The descriptive information for each chart will tend to be found in the explanatory boxes within the charts themselves, with the important ones highlighted in colour. The information alongside the table number will tend to be more in the nature of comments or conclusions. When this is highlighted in colour, it is very important in terms of its contribution to the total profile.

If the stereotype tables are snapshots, the following charts can be seen as small pictures, which can then be combined to make up a fine-grained demographic portrait of each political variable under scrutiny. We emphasize that we're looking here at what happened to the actual votes, in terms of who lived in what area, we're not looking survey results from an opinion poll. So causality has to be inferred. But at least we know we're dealing with the total population rather than a sample, and we are able to break it up into credible and reasonably objective units for preliminary analysis and subsequent attitudinal research.

#### **Current Schooling**



Chart 3. Current schooling. The ALP campaign scored big gains amongst parents of Government school children, but not parents of Catholic or Independent schools, where parents tend to have higher incomes. This swing from parents of young kids drove most other housing correlations, including home buyers.

#### **Completed Schooling**



Chart 4. Completed schooling. We are looking at middle Australia here who wind up in industrial and administrative jobs. The Greens dominated those who finished Grade 12 and became eligible for further academic study.

#### **Qualifications Male & Female**



■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 5. The swing to Rudd emerges here amongst those males and females with certificate qualifications, a large group of second and third quartile income earners. Graduates went the other way.

#### Age Male



Chart 6. This is the first time we've seen a swing from children, but not from all persons the same age as their parents. Clearly the 20-40 year olds without kids swing to the Coalition. Otherwise there would be a lot more pink above the line for 30 plus group.

#### Age Female



#### **Income Male**



Chart 8. Until 2007, John Howard won swings from a large second quartile Centrelink group and a self-employed skilled blue collar third quartile group. Kevin Rudd seems to have won some of the former and most of the latter. Hence he won the election.

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#### **Income Female**



Chart 9. Kevin Rudd won the middle income quartiles previously associated with John Howard since 1996. The Greens seem to have been unhelpful to Labor in the top quartile, where the flow of preferences seems to be heading back to the right.

#### **Family Income**



Chart 10. Same story as for the individual income groups. Labor appears to be winning back most of the Centrelink group of former Howard supporters and also a lot of self employed skilled blue collar men and their middle white collar partners (see following occupation charts).



#### **Occupation Male**



■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 11. Pink is the colour to watch on this chart. Labor lost professionals, white collar men remained at 2004 levels, while skilled and semi-skilled blue collar men voted for Kevin in big numbers.

#### **Occupation Female**



Chart 12. A pretty polarized chart. The Greens cleaned up with professional women, while Labor bombed badly, reversing a three-election trend towards Labor. Aside from Managers, the ALP won reasonable swings from all other female groups.

#### **Industry Male**



Chart 13. Labor consolidated existing strong support from blue collar industries, but not white collar industries and the public service, where union membership levels are still high. We saw Labor did well from parents of Government school children, but not, it seems, teachers (or public servants or health workers), despite expensive union campaigns.

#### **Industry Female**



Chart 14. Big swings to ALP (same as for males) with Manufacturing, Construction and Transport, with the addition of increased support from the big female retail industry group. But again, Labor bombed in a wide cross section of white collar and public sector industries. The union campaign seems to have mobilized support in these sectors for their clients, rather than their members.

#### **Religion Male selected**



■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 15. We've seen profiles like this for Christian schools and for Family First, but never for the ALP. There are a lot of Church going voters here who like Kevin Rudd and they live in key marginal seats, especially in Queensland. The regression analysis confirms the power of these variables in 2007, to the extent **the Labor win would have been problematic without them.** 

#### Work Commute



Chart 16. The chart tells the story. The car as a driver group is the main show in town for outer urban marginals and allowing petrol prices to increase, while looking like you can't do anything about it, or like you don't care, is not a great way to win re-election. A ten point plan is better than no plan at all.



#### Mobility



■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 17. About 40 percent of voters move every five years. Which means both our census based modeling and the pendulum are relying on the assumption that the individuals moving into these houses vote the same way as the voters they replaced. The fact that they do has been a source of fascination for us for 35 years. The cells come and go, but the organism remains the same.

#### **Number Cars**



Chart 18.Here we see the demarcation line between the inner suburbs with no cars or one car and the commuter belt, with two jobs and two plus cars. This reinforces earlier comments about petrol prices being fatal for a Government which says it can't do anything about the problem.





■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 19. The Home Buyer group seems like a descriptive, rather than a causal variable. We saw no sign of it in the regression analysis for ALP swing. Home buyers swung to Labor because they had young kids and hence weren't renters or owners.

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■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 20. Basically, if there were no kids at home, there was a swing against Labor. But if there were younger kids at home, the swing was to Labor. So child care and education won Labor votes from parents, but lost Labor votes from non-parents.

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#### **Economic Means**



■ 2PP ALP vote 2007 ■ 2PP Swing to ALP 04-07 ■ Primary Greens 07 Reps ■ Australian Means (RHS)

Chart 21. The higher the income, the bigger the Green vote. The lower the income, the bigger the swing to Labor. Mortgage size and rents weren't significant. So much for mortgage stress.



#### **Other Means**



Chart 22. The mortgage stress levels grew because a lot of women turned 60 before 2006 and joined the 60 plus mortgage stress group, which is now growing simply because boomers are getting older and re-arranging finances for retirement.



Chart 23. The more kids in the family, the bigger the swing to Kevin Rudd. But if there were no kids, the swing went the other way. If you take money from one group of voters to give it to another group, don't expect the losers to vote for the package.

#### Age (Male) by H'Hold Income, Mortgage & Mortgage Stress



Mortgage Stress Med hhold inc Med mortgage

Chart 24. Here we see the standard life cycle of household debt, as at 2006, with young families under some stress, as they have been since couples starting looking for caves. The change is the large emerging older group, rearranging finances for retirement.

#### **Mortgage Payments**



Chart 25. All the action is taking place here in the third quartile, somewhat higher than we would expect from the income distribution seen above. These are home buyers with young children, with the latter driving the swing, rather than the former.





Chart 26. The ALP is dominating the third quartile, with Greens and Coalition in charge of the top quartile. This has to be a worrying sign for a number of senior ALP MPs for inner city electorates in our capital cities. The downward envy from higher income private renters (and non parents) is quite clear. Even more so, if we took out public housing renters, as the curve would shift down.

### **Selected Statistics**

			ALP
State	Electorate	Highest and Lowest Residuals	RESIDUAL
New South Wales	Eden-Monaro	Mike Kelly	6.72
Victoria	Holt	Anthony Byrne	6.71
New South Wales	Shortland	Jill Hall	6.64
Western Austral	O'Connor	Wilson Tuckey	6.10
Victoria	Wannon	David Hawker	5.99
New South Wales	Hunter	Joel Fitzgibbon	5.76
Australian Capi	Canberra	Annette Ellis	5.75
Victoria	Ballarat	Catherine King	5.59
Queensland	Herbert	Peter Lindsay	-5.73
Victoria	Murray	Sharman Stone	-5.73
Western Austral	Pearce	Judi Moylan	-5.94
New South Wales	Lyne	Mark Vaile	-5.95
New South Wales	Greenway	Louise Markus	-6.16
New South Wales	Bennelong	John Howard	-7.00
South Australia	Sturt	Chris Pyne	-7.05
New South Wales	Hughes	Danna Vale	-7.17

PS Nicole Cornes by the way, polled much one percent better than predicted (against a sitting Liberal which is an excellent result), despite the treatment she received from the usual suspects. There were just too many professionals in Boothby heading for Howard.

Absolutely no correspondence will be entered into with sitting MPs re any other residuals. We think you are all wonderful. Table 6. This table shows top positive and negative residuals for the ALP.

Typically, sitting ALP MPs would have a positive residual, due to the influence of their personal vote and access to staff, postage and office facilities. Mike Kelly was an Opposition candidate however and overcame these disadvantages to win the seat (so we included his name). ALP candidates also performed well, relative to sitting Coalition MPs in O'Connor and Wannon. This is probably due to regional factors, such as the lack of an effective National party presence in these rural areas. More poor rural people vote National than Liberal.

In the negative residual territory for the ALP, we would expect to find the more effective sitting Coalition MPs and campaigns and we're not surprised to see the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in this list – although often Prime Ministers who are quite popular nationally are distracted by their duties and eventually have no personal votes at all in their own seats.

The negative seven percent ALP residual for John Howard means the local ALP campaign fell seven percent short of the predicted result.

So John Howard the local MP didn't lose Bennelong – rather it was lost by John Howard's loss of support for his Government across the country. (The same thing happened to Al Grassby in Riverina in 1974). Bennelong should become safe Labor without John Howard's personal vote.

### **Background to the research**

The Election Modelling Project began in South Australia in the late sixties and early seventies, a state where the Labor Party was led by some innovative thinkers, including Mick Young, David Combe and Don Dunstan. At that time full voting rights for non-property holders had only just been introduced to the SA Legislative Council, but enrolment itself was voluntary. To win elections in the upper house, the ALP had to find and enrol its own voters, in the style of the US voter registration drives.

Flinders University Academics Neal Blewett and Dean Jaensch had been doing some preliminary research on the demographic profiles of Labor and non Labor voters and the current work developed from my studies under these two academics at Flinders University and later with Don Dunstan and Graham Maguire in the Premier's Office. They all deserve thanks. Assistance with processing and analysing data was provided by IT expert and statistician John Lockwood, who has had the misfortune to work with me on this Election Modelling Project for the past 34 years. This was in the days when supercomputers had only slightly more processing power than a modern wristwatch and data had to be entered manually onto punch cards, which were stored in shoe boxes. One rainy Adelaide night, a shoe box was dropped and John spent the rest of the night drying our only data source in front of the radiator. It was early days for computer technology and democracy in SA.

When running a grass roots enrolment drive campaign for the ALP, if you had 20 volunteers, you tended to put them into the areas where they were most likely to find Labor voters. To do this, we profiled votes on known state boundaries against demographic data from the same boundaries, using regression analysis, to reproduce votes by small scale 220 home Census Collectors Districts.

We then began integrating voting data, Census Data and electoral rolls, by CCD, to run citizenship and enrolment campaigns for eligible migrants and for flat dwellers at election time. Flat dwellers are a mobile group and tend to ignore electoral enrolment. In 1975, the South Australian Government won re-election by one seat and that seat was won by votes enrolled from local flats before the closure of the rolls. In other words, the work was designed with a practical outcome in mind and it delivered results. Subsequently, the integration of these three databases with customer relations software has been adopted by all major parties in Australia.

When the electoral rolls for SA were finally dragged out of the dark ages, we turned our attention to swinging voters and began to use the same statistical techniques to modernise campaign techniques. Due to the mass canvassing nature of the enrolment drives, candidates learned the value of the door to door canvas and intuitively began doorknocking for swinging votes in safe Labor areas, because that's where they'd done their enrolment drives and because that's where they would have their views reinforced by sympathetic voters. Other Labor candidates who didn't mind the odd dog bite decided that it was smarter to canvas for votes in safe Liberal areas, as that gave them more chance of finding a non-Labor voter whose mind they could possibly change.



John Lockwood and I then turned to the same statistical techniques to find swinging voters. We wanted to find out who they were and where they lived. So we began getting a simple profile of swinging voters by using a combination of known boundaries and profiling recent electoral swings against census data from the same boundaries. We then used regression analysis to tell us precisely where a busy candidate could, for example, doorknock 75 percent of his or her swinging voters by canvassing only 25 percent of the houses in the electorate. We could also tell the candidate what sort of voters they were and they turned out to be young families, with at least one pre-school age child, in the early years of paying off their first home loan.

The votes of this 25-35 group was then up for grabs and between 1966 and 1972 Gough Whitlam grabbed it, winning a swathe of outer urban seats with disproportionate swings. Whitlam effectively reshuffled seats on the Electoral Pendulum, and moved the so-called cube rule line downwards, making the average swing concept nonsensical. He assured me in a later interview that this was all deliberate planning on his part "Of course, Comrade", and it probably was. Politicians have been trying to do it ever since, with varying success.

When Bill Hayden won almost 50 percent of the 2PP vote in 1980, but only 41 percent of the seats, John Lockwood and I were asked to find out why. We then profiled, using extensive descriptive and inferential stats, elections for 1966, 1969, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977 and 1980 and used this analysis to identify national key demographic groups and corresponding election profiles for key marginal seats. Part of the analysis was aimed squarely at creating a non-uniform swing, specifically to move the ratio of seats won, up to and beyond the ratio of votes won. These were used in the subsequent ALP campaigns in the eighties but were apparently forgotten by the time Kim Beazley ran his campaign in 1998, when he won a minority of seats with a majority of the preferred vote despite a swing big enough to win Government, according to the Pendulum. Kim simply neglected to give tax cuts to voters living in marginal Liberal seats.

My younger brother Quentin carried out similar profiles of the ALP vote for 1987, 1990 and 1993. John Lockwood and I have subsequently profiled elections for 1998, 2001, 2004 and now 2007. So, apart from 1983, 1984 and 1996, we have profiles with consistent political and demographic benchmarks for all Australian elections going back 40 years. We have also profiled at selected elections, the National Party, the Australian Democrats, the Greens, Family First and One Nation. It's always interesting profiling a new party, as it's a good guide to which of the main parties is under stress and from whom.

In a two party preferred system, regression analysis provides a predicted outcome for the Labor Party and for the Coalition Parties. One minus the other adds to 100 percent. The difference between the predicted and the observed vote is called a residual, and given the fact that our modelling typically explains more than 90 percent of the variation in votes, (about the same as the pendulum) the residual tends to be a pretty good approximation of the value of one party's candidate and campaign, versus those for the other party. This enables us to tell, for example,



that, with Graham Edwards' large personal vote in Cowan last year, that the ALP would struggle to win that seat, despite contrary predictions from the average swing model inherent in the Pendulum.

I should acknowledge the Godfather of Australian election research Malcolm Mackerras, who has done an outstanding job as a collector of reliable archival information upon which generations of students, including myself, have relied and never said thanks. I also thank all the persons who have assisted with, or sponsored this research over the past 34 years, including former ANU academic Marian Simms, who provided advice re methodologies and female voting behaviour.

